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ABSTRACT
BEHAVIORAL AND COGNITIVE CORRELATES OF INTOLERANCE OF
UNCERTAINTY IN CHILDREN WITH AND WITHOUT ANXIETY DISORDERS
Colette Marie Gramszlo
June 25th, 2018
Intolerance of Uncertainty (IU) has long been identified as a proximal risk factor
for the development of anxiety disorders, and more recently has been implicated in the
development of emotional disorders broadly. However, little is known about how IU and
psychopathology symptoms relate, limiting the degree to which IU can be identified prior
to the development of emotional disorders and targeted during the intervention of
disorder symptoms. The current study reviews several areas of literature to inform a
model by which IU impacts anxiety symptoms. First, uncertainty processing and the
development of uncertainty processing in childhood are reviewed. Next, IU is reviewed
and model of the impact of IU on uncertainty processing is proposed. Finally, childhood
IU is reviewed and current gaps in the childhood IU literature are identified. The current
study hypothesized that IU contributes to uncertainty avoidance, which is reflected by
cognitive and behavioral processes associated with decision-making under uncertainty.
Specifically, this study tested the hypothesis that children with higher IU demonstrate
less efficient information processing and decision-making, particularly in the presence of
ambiguous information. Further, this study tested the hypotheses that the relation
between IU and disorder symptoms would be moderate by individual differences in
v

higher order cognitive control processes implicated in decision-making. The study
recruited 47 children, 23 with anxiety disorders and 24 without, to test these hypotheses.
Children completed a decision-making computer task and children and their parents
completed questionnaires. Overall, the results partially supported the study hypotheses.
IU predicted greater reaction time (RT) during the task but RT was not greater in the
presence of ambiguous, as compared to neutral or threatening, stimuli for children with
high IU. IU predicted greater distraction from the task target and distraction was
increased in the presence of ambiguous stimuli for children with high IU. Accuracy was
not related to IU. Exploratory analyses indicated that children with high IU demonstrated
greater RT variability compared to children with low IU, and greater distractibility in
earlier, compared to later, task trials. Results are discussed in terms of theoretical and
clinical implications for future study and intervention of IU.
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INTRODUCTION
Uncertainties, large and small, are a constant presence in daily life, and the
resolution of uncertainty is a fundamental task of the human brain. We are driven to
reduce uncertainty as it arises through cognitive and emotional processes that facilitate
decision-making behaviors, whether determining what to eat for dinner or which career to
pursue. For some, however, uncertainty presents a unique challenge. Intolerance of
Uncertainty (IU) is defined as the inability to endure the unpleasant responses triggered
by the perceived absence of sufficient information (Carleton, 2016). IU is dispositional,
and individuals with high IU experience aversive reactions to uncertainty across contexts.
Elevated levels of IU have been identified across a wide variety of psychiatric disorders,
including anxiety, post-traumatic stress, obsessive/compulsive, eating and mood
disorders.
While IU appears to precede the onset of psychopathology symptoms, it is unclear
why this relation exists. Current research in this area has relied primarily on
questionnaires measuring beliefs and opinions regarding uncertainty, limiting our
knowledge of the neurobiological and behavioral characteristics of those with high IU.
The introduction of the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) has highlighted the need to
integrate research concerning core domains of neurobehavioral function, such as affect
and cognition, with clinical research to clarify the fundamental mechanisms of
psychopathology (Sanislow et al., 2010) and allow basic science research to directly
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inform the study and treatment of psychopathology (Cuthbert & Insel, 2013). However,
no models have linked IU to psychopathology with regard to these core domains.
Examining IU among youth, who are still developing the ability to process
uncertainty, may inform models of IU as a predictor of psychopathology. In childhood,
uncertainty presents an opportunity to learn new information, challenge existing beliefs
about the world, and practice problem-solving skills. For individuals with high IU,
uncertainty is unacceptable, distressing, paralyzing and ultimately avoided. Children with
high IU likely limit their exposure to uncertainty, hindering their uncertainty processing
development. Avoidance of uncertainty at a young age may contribute to maladaptive
uncertainty processing strategies, which ultimately allows psychopathology symptoms to
emerge. Newly created, age appropriate measurement tools (e.g., Intolerance of
Uncertainty Scale for Children) have allowed IU to be identified in children as young as
seven (Comer et al., 2009), but there remains a paucity of research concerning IU in
childhood and the characteristics of children with high IU in uncertain environments.
Given the increasing interest in IU as a transdiagnostic construct with clinical
utility (Shihata, McEvoy, Mullan, & Carleton, 2016), a clearer picture of the behavioral
and cognitive correlates of IU during the development of uncertainty processing (i.e., in
childhood) is necessary at this time to understand how IU relates to the emergence of
psychopathology. Uncertainty processing and the development of this processing will
first be reviewed as a background on relevant methods and systems. IU literature will be
reviewed and a model of the maintenance of IU will be proposed. Childhood IU literature
will then be reviewed, along with an overview of the limits and future directions of this
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work. The current study aimed to begin addressing these limitations by investigating
uncertainty processing among youth with and without anxiety disorders.
Uncertainty Processing
Uncertainty refers to the realization that there is insufficient information in the
present environment to make predictions about the future (Yu & Dayan, 2005), and the
brain relies on external and internal information to resolve uncertainty as it arises.
External information includes environmental cues—the facial expression of a stranger or
the perceived speed of a car coming toward you. Internally, emotional arousal, emotional
valence, and related bodily sensation provide informational cues. This bottom-up
information interacts with top-down predictions about the future to determine whether
sufficient certainty exists. When top-down predictions (e.g., hearing a fire alarm and
predicting that the building is on fire) are violated by bottom-up information (e.g., no
smoke or heat are present), uncertainty arises (Yu & Dayan, 2003).
Several related terms are used across uncertainty and IU literature: expected
uncertainty, unexpected uncertainty, ambiguity, risk, probability and value. Uncertainty is
said to be expected when a cue relating to an outcome is unreliable. For instance, when a
car’s left-hand turn signal flashes, there is a good chance that the driver will soon make a
left turn. However, the driver may have signaled too soon, and there exists some expected
uncertainty regarding when the driver will turn left. The degree of expected uncertainty,
sometimes termed risk, may fluctuate depending on certain conditions, such as the
geographic location or the speed of the driver. If, however, the driver turns right,
unexpected uncertainty, or ambiguity, exists (Bland & Schaefer, 2012). In the case of
unexpected uncertainty, the cue itself has changed and a belief has been violated (Cohen
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& Aston-Jones, 2005). Expected and unexpected uncertainty activate separable neural
substrates, with expected uncertainty activating regions associated with error detection
and unexpected uncertainty activating regions associated with novelty detection,
providing evidence that humans process these two types of uncertainty in distinct ways
(Payzan-LeNestour, Dunne, Bossaerts, & O’Doherty, 2013).
Uncertainty is resolved through decision-making, and decisions represent
responses to uncertainty. Decision-making is defined as the selection of a response,
following a cue, based on both the predicted value and the computed probability of the
outcome associated with that response (FeldmanHall, Glimcher, Baker, & Phelps, 2016).
Uncertainty, as described above, arises when the response paired with a stimulus is an
unreliable or volatile predictor of an outcome. Decision-making is a temporal process,
and the selection of a response to uncertainty is based on knowledge of past responses
and previously learned causal statistics within the environment (Huettel, Song, &
McCarthy, 2005). If a child is cued by their teacher to note an upcoming exam, that child
may decide whether or not to study based on how much studying was required to do well
on past exams. Decision-making requires future based processing as well. Selecting
“study” as a response to “upcoming test” also depends on how risky it will be to do
poorly on this specific upcoming exam, and how rewarding it will be to do well.
Decision science has traditionally studied responses to uncertainty by examining
which options are selected, how accurately decisions are made, and how quickly those
decisions are made (Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 2007). New models of
decision-making reflect a recent paradigm shift within the field toward the cognitive
processes underlying decision-making, including “basic perceptual, attentional, memory
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and aggregation processes” (Oppenheimer & Kelso, 2015, p. 277) in addition to
observable behavior under uncertainty. Emotion and cognitive control are two key
processes elicited by uncertainty and involved in the resolution of uncertainty through
decision-making.
Emotion and uncertainty. Uncertainty and emotions intersect at multiple points
during decision-making, both arising from and contributing to decisions, and affecting
thoughts and behaviors associated with decision-making (Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, &
Kassam, 2015). Of note, the terms affect and emotion are used somewhat interchangeably
throughout this proposal to reflect the linguistic choices of different authors. Though the
two do differ somewhat, with affect referring more to psycho-physiological experiences
and emotions being social constructions of those experiences, they are largely
synonymous (Russell, 2003). Uncertainty in decision-making interacts with both
emotional arousal and emotional valence. Arousal refers to the amount of experienced
affect, while valence refers to the kind of affective state (Winkielman, Knutson, Paulus,
& Trujillo, 2007). Emotions can also be integral to decision-making, arising directly from
a situation, or incidental to decision-making, arising from one situation and affecting
decisions made about another.
Uncertainty increases emotional arousal and increases in specific emotions
reciprocally increase the perception of uncertainty. In a series of four studies examining
the interaction of emotion and uncertainty, Bar-Anan, Wilson and Gilbert (2009) showed
participants film clips aimed at eliciting positive or negative affect. Participants in the
uncertainty condition were prompted to state phrases such as “I’m not sure what’s
happening” while viewing the clips, while those in the certainty condition stated phrases
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such as “I understand” and “I see what’s happening.” Participants in the uncertainty
condition reported more extreme affect related to the clips, despite having received the
same objective amount of information. This suggests that despite the true availability of
information in an environment, the perception of uncertainty elicits increased affect. The
authors hypothesize that perceived uncertainty may elicit affect to make goal-relevant
cues in the environment more salient, so that they can be attended to and used as
additional information to resolve uncertainty (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009).
Tiedens and Linton (2001) explored the interaction of uncertainty, emotion and
information processing in a series of experiments. In the first experiment, undergraduates
were induced to feel positive or negative emotions using an emotional memories task,
then asked to make predictions about the future and rate their subjective certainty about
these predictions. They found differences in the effect of emotional valence on decisions
by demonstrating that participants who were primed to feel positive emotions (i.e.,
happy) were more certain about their predictions, while participants primed to feel
negative emotions (i.e., anxious) were less certain. In a second experiment, they found
that emotional valence also affected depth of thought under uncertainty, by showing that
participants induced to feel happy, and thus more certain about their decisions, were more
likely to rely on less effortful cognitive processing during decision-making, while
participants induced to feel anxious, and thus less certain, were more likely to rely on
effortful and controlled cognitive processing (Larissa Z. Tiedens, 2001).
Importantly, the mood induction portion of each experiment was incidental to the
second portion of the experiment involving information processing and decision-making.
An individual does not need to feel uncertainty about the decision itself to experience
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uncertainty while making a decision, and it is hypothesized that individuals who
experience more negative affect in general are also more likely to perceive uncertainty
across environments and experiences. Tiedens and Linton’s (2001) experiments also
demonstrate that anxiety, a specific negative mood state, facilitates controlled processing
of information during decision-making. Anxiety elicits the perception of uncertainty,
which then triggers a methodical analysis of all available information to create certainty
about a decision (Larissa Z. Tiedens, 2001).
Cognitive control and uncertainty. Cognitive control refers to higher order, topdown processes responsible for goal-directed activity. Humans typically conserve
cognitive resources by operating through automatic processing unless triggered to switch
toward controlled processing (Mushtaq, Bland, & Schaefer, 2011). Triggers that initiate
controlled cognitive processing include the detection of errors (Braver, Gray, & Burgess,
2012; Yeung & Cohen, 2006), conflict between competing responses (Botvinick, Braver,
Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), and changes in the prediction of error likelihood (Brown
& Braver, 2005). Broadly, cognitive control takes over when existing models of the
environment do not match incoming information, indicating that there is a mismatch
between available representations of the environment and the actual environment, leading
automatic processing to yield undesirable outcomes (e.g., errors). This mismatch
represents uncertainty about the environment, and controlled cognitive processing allows
for new representations to be learned so that individuals can adapt their behavior in the
future (Mushtaq et al., 2011).
Emotion acts as a catalyst for cognitive control processes. Errors, and the
uncertainty they signal, are aversive in nature, and conflicts arising between personal
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goals and outcomes elicit negative affect (e.g., wanting to do well in a job interview and
not receiving a job offer; Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013). This negative affect plays a causal
role in the recruitment of cognitive control, allowing an individual to alter behavior,
thereby decreasing the likelihood of repeating errors and increasing certainty about future
outcomes (Inzlicht, Bartholow, & Hirsh, 2015). Cognitive control also reciprocally
impacts emotional experiences through emotion regulation (Lerner et al., 2015; Ochsner
& Gross, 2005). Emotion regulation encompasses both effortful increases and decreases
in affect, through cognitive and behavioral strategies (Lewis, 2013).
Despite findings that both emotion and cognitive control are key to uncertainty
processing, only one study has examined the effects of emotion regulation on uncertainty
processing. In two experiments, participants watched movie clips which induced either
fear or disgust and were prompted to adaptively regulate this emotion through cognitive
reappraisal, maladaptively regulate through emotional suppression, or not regulate at all.
During decision-making tasks following the movie clips, participants who used cognitive
reappraisal demonstrated significantly less aversion to uncertainty and performed better
on the tasks than participants who suppressed their emotion or did not use an emotion
regulation strategy (Heilman, Crişan, Houser, Miclea, & Miu, 2010). These results
suggest that individuals who adaptively down-regulate emotions as they arise are less
averse to uncertainty and more efficient at resolving uncertainty.
Figure 1 summarizes this review of uncertainty processing. (1) When an
individual becomes aware that either the information available in the present environment
or the individual’s existing representations about information in the present environment
are insufficient to make decisions about the future (2) uncertainty arises. This uncertainty
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can be expected or unexpected, and people track the causal statistics of events to inform
processing of uncertainty. Both varieties of uncertainty increase learning rates by
facilitating (3) emotional processing and (4) cognitive control to form new
representations or update old representations about the environment and to regulate the
emotions elicited by uncertainty. The adaptive regulation of affect by higher order
processes allows for certainty to be reached. Human resolution of uncertainty has thus far
been studied in the context of decision-making paradigms. (5) Decision-making is
determined by the interaction of emotional, or affective, processing and controlled, or
deliberative, processing.

Figure 1. An illustration of the conditions under which uncertainty arises and is resolved.
Childhood Uncertainty Processing
Children differ in both their understanding of uncertainty and their ability to
resolve it. In middle childhood, children begin to accurately monitor uncertainty (Roderer
9

& Roebers, 2010) and learn that they can use information in the present environment to
make decisions about the future (Lagattuta & Sayfan, 2011). Adults tend to allocate
attention toward goal-relevant cues in uncertain environments, but young children are
less able to identify, and therefore less able to attend to, goal-relevant cues. Rather, they
scan environments broadly, largely guided by bottom-up information processing, due to
immature, or weak, cognitive control (Chevalier & Blaye, 2009; Chrysikou, Weber, &
Thompson-Schill, 2014). While this makes children slower, less accurate and less
efficient at certain decision-making tasks, young children benefit from less cognitive
control. Weaker cognitive control encourages exploration and manipulation of
environments, allowing children to learn statistical regularities in the environment and
form top-down representations (Chevalier, 2015). As cognitive control develops, children
learn the meaning of certain cues and increasingly pay attention to these cues,
reciprocally allowing knowledge to build. Ambiguity poses particular difficulty for
children, compared to adults, as they are beginning to develop knowledge of cues but still
depend on environmental salience to guide actions. While older children can infer goals
from subtler cues, cue transparency influences reaction time (RT) and accuracy through
adulthood (Logan & Schneider, 2006). Results of eye tracking studies have demonstrated
that as children age they are less likely to evaluate all available information, and more
likely to base decisions on only relevant information within uncertain environments
(Lagattuta & Sayfan, 2013).
Cognitive control undergoes tremendous development throughout childhood,
continuing into young adulthood. Cognitive control is difficult for young children, and
the development of such control is reflected in increasing speed, accuracy and efficiency

10

of complex tasks as children age (Diamond, 2014). Development of cognitive control is
driven by early growth of the prefrontal cortex (PFC), and subsequent pruning of
unnecessary synapses in later childhood, which allows focalization of function to emerge.
For example, young children show neural activation in areas unrelated to cognitive
control on controlled tasks, which decreases into adulthood (Durston et al., 2006). Thus,
cognitive control has been described as a diffuse, “unitary construct” which becomes
differentiated with age (Carlson, Zelazo, & Faja, 2013).
Cognitive control is commonly categorized into three core executive functions
(EFs): inhibition, including behavioral inhibition and cognitive inhibition, working
memory, and cognitive flexibility (Miyake et al., 2000). The development of cognitive
control is characterized by increases in each of these areas, such that children are more
impulsive and inattentive as compared to adults. Working memory and inhibition
undergo the greatest development during preschool years (approximately ages three
through six), while more focalized development of controlled attention, organization and
flexibility occur during school-age years (approximately ages seven through 13; Carlson
et al., 2013). During early childhood and preschool years, behavior is driven more by
environmental stimuli than goals, but this balance changes through middle childhood and
adolescents, such that adult behavior is more resistant to distraction from environmental
stimuli and guided by internally held goals.
Evidence suggests that aspects of cognitive control associated with affect reach
developmental maturity later than aspects associated with affectively-neutral cognitive
control (Zelazo & Müller, 2010). Performance on tasks designed to elicit affect during
decision-making, such as the Iowa Gambling Task, develops slowly into adulthood,
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whereas performance on affectively-neutral EF tasks, such as Backward Digit Span,
reaches adult levels in adolescence (Prencipe et al., 2011). Further, individual differences
in affectively-relevant EFs are more stable than affectively-neutral EFs across
development (Zelazo & Carlson, 2012). On affective decision-making tasks, the ability to
learn from negative emotional cues (e.g., the aversive affect associated with an error) and
change one’s behavior accordingly develops with age. Adults are more sensitive to the
affective response associated with errors, which allows them to learn about the causal
statistics of the environment more quickly and make more advantageous decisions than
children under uncertainty (Cauffman et al., 2010). Middle childhood and adolescence
represent an important period of maturation for emotional processes related to goaldirected behavior.
Adults learn to avoid negative outcomes more quickly due to the development of
cognitive control broadly, and to the development of emotion regulation specifically.
Emotion regulation develops linearly from middle childhood into adulthood. Cognitive
reappraisal, for example, a skill which is associated with the ability to tolerate stressful
events and processes emotions adaptively, increases through young adulthood (Gullone,
Hughes, King, & Tonge, 2010). The use of emotional suppression, a maladaptive
emotion regulation associated with reduced positive affect and the maintenance of
negative emotionality, decreases linearly through childhood and into adulthood as
adaptive emotion regulation skills come online (Gullone et al., 2010).
Prior to adolescence, children learn to effectively identify and resolve uncertainty.
Weaker cognitive control in childhood allows young children to explore their
environment and facilitates learning, but also makes them less efficient at decision-
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making. As inhibitory and attentional control mature, children are more likely to attend to
environmental cues that are relevant to their goals and use these cues as information to
make decisions. With age, children are more able to learn from the negative emotions
associated with uncertainty, down-regulate these emotions effectively, and make more
efficient and accurate decisions as a result. Avoidance of uncertainty in childhood may
limit the development of decision-making skills and contribute to rigid, maladaptive
patterns of responding to uncertainty.
Intolerance of Uncertainty
IU was originally proposed by Freeston and colleagues as part of an effort to
elucidate the cognitive processes associated with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD;
Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). IU was measured in this
seminal study through the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS), whose items were
created based on clinical observations of individuals with GAD (Birrell, Meares,
Wilkinson, & Freeston, 2011). The IUS measures cognitive, emotional and behavioral
reactions to uncertainty with items such as, “Uncertainty stops me from having a strong
opinion” and “Uncertainty makes life intolerable” (Freeston et al., 1994). The IUS and
the IUS short form, a 12 question adaptation of the original 27 item measure, continue to
be the only measures of IU (Carleton, Norton, & Asmundson, 2007). Given the way the
IUS was developed, early studies of IU focused exclusively on GAD and worry. Indeed,
though IU is now linked to a wide range of disorders, it consistently demonstrates a
unique and robust link to both worry and GAD (Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997;
Gentes & Ruscio, 2011).
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As studies of IU have expanded their scope past worry and GAD, the definition
has been altered to accommodate updated findings. Following results demonstrating that
individuals with high IU are more likely to interpret ambiguous situations as threatening,
as compared to both positive and negative situations, IU was defined as a “cognitive
vulnerability” (Koerner & Dugas, 2008). Koerner and Dugas (2008) proposed that, as a
cognitive vulnerability, IU is a causal risk factor for the development of emotional
disorders, contributes to the etiology of these disorders directly, and is malleable but
dispositional. IU is separable from personality traits and temperamental risk factors (e.g.,
neuroticism, negative affect) and other cognitive risk factors (e.g., anxiety sensitivity,
fear of negative evaluation) and predicts disorder symptoms above and beyond these
related factors (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009). IU mediates the relation between neuroticism
and disorder symptoms such as worry, agoraphobic cognitions, and depression (McEvoy
& Mahoney, 2012) and represents a “lower order” factor as compared to higher order
factors such as neuroticism (Carleton, 2016). IU is thus described as the “filter” through
which psychopathology arises (Shihata et al., 2016). The most updated descriptions of IU
seek to incorporate this cognitive hypothesis with findings that individuals with high IU
exhibit physiological, behavioral and emotional differences as well. Carleton (2016a)
thus proposes that “IU is an individual’s dispositional incapacity to endure the aversive
response triggered by the perceived absence of salient, key, or sufficient information, and
sustained by the associated perception of uncertainty” (p. 31).
Characteristics of IU. Though IU has received much attention in anxiety
disorders literature, elevated levels of IU have been identified among individuals with
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD; Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa, 2003),
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posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Fetzner, Horswill, Boelen, & Carleton, 2013) and
major depressive disorder (MDD; Gentes & Ruscio, 2011). Thus, theories of IU posit that
it is a transdiagnostic factor associated with emotional disorders broadly (Einstein, 2014).
Indeed, reductions in IU through treatment are associated with reductions in overall
impairment associated with emotional disorders (Boswell, Thompson-Hollands,
Farchione, & Barlow, 2013).
Examinations of IU in relation to similar constructs have allowed characteristics
of those with IU to emerge. High IU demonstrates a unique association with repetitive
negative thinking, as compared to similar cognitive processes such as perfectionism and
perceived control (Buhr & Dugas, 2006; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2013). For instance, in the
case of anxiety disorders, IU’s relation to symptom severity is mediated by worry,
whereas IU’s relation to depressive symptoms is mediated by rumination (Yook, Kim,
Suh, & Lee, 2010). Reductions in IU predict reductions in worry over time, providing
evidence that among adults the inability to tolerate uncertainty may cause worry (Bomyea
et al., 2015). High IU is also associated with a reduced ability to extinguish learned fear
associations, such that individuals with high IU maintain fear responses during extinction
paradigms while those with low IU do not (Morriss, Christakou, & van Reekum, 2016).
Birrell, Meares, Wilkinson and Freeston (2011) point out in their review that
researchers have focused on validating the construct of IU, with little attention to the
phenomenology and development of IU. Indeed, IU as a construct did not develop
through investigations of the nature of uncertainty, and the nature of distress caused by
this uncertainty, but through observations of those with an active and specific emotional
disorder. Carleton’s (2016a) definition highlights the etiological nature of IU by
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proposing that IU arises through distress to responses elicited by uncertainty, and is
maintained through the continued perception of uncertainty. Dispositional IU likely
contributes to individual differences in uncertainty processing, which then impact the
development of psychopathology.
Individual differences in uncertainty processing. Emotions are both
information and informational regulators (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011). Fear and
anxiety are more closely associated with uncertainty than other emotions such as
happiness or anger, and thus fear and anxiety facilitate the acquisition of information
under uncertainty (Frey, Hertwig, & Rieskamp, 2014). This relation is reciprocal, as
previously described, and perceived uncertainty also increases affect (Bar-Anan et al.,
2009). Some have proposed that individual differences in uncertainty tolerance underlie
all clinically significant experiences of anxiety (Carleton, 2012). The Uncertainty and
Anticipation Model of Anxiety (UAMA) proposes a neurobiological and psychological
framework through which individual differences in physiology, emotion, behavior and
cognition interact to explain anxious reactions to uncertainty (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013).
Though this model does not explicitly address IU, Grupe and Nitschke (2013) suggest
that IU may represent the collection of “exaggerated physiological and subjective
emotional responses to uncertainty” (p. 10). It can be hypothesized, then, that individual
differences in emotional experiences and emotional processing, as in the case of
emotional disorders, are likely linked to individual differences in uncertainty processing.
Thus, the following section reviews individual differences in uncertainty processing.
Given the specific link between anxiety and uncertainty, this section focuses on these
individual differences in uncertainty processing within anxiety and anxiety disorders.
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Individual differences in emotion under uncertainty. Emotions are a necessary
and integral aspect of decision-making under uncertainty (Lerner et al., 2015).
Individuals with high IU require more information before reaching a decision
(Ladouceur, Talbot, & Dugas, 1997) and may experience increases in affect under
uncertainty, above and beyond the increased affect experienced by those with low IU, as
a means of increasing the salience of relevant cues in the environment. Adults with high
IU interpret ambiguous information as more threatening than overtly positive, negative or
neutral information. This suggests that among adults with high IU, uncertainty itself may
serve as a fear cue, which increases negative affect specifically (Oglesby, Raines, Short,
Capron, & Schmidt, 2016). Only one study of emotion and IU has differentiated between
expected and unexpected uncertainty. High IU individuals relative to low IU individuals
showed increased negative affect and biased threat appraisals toward unexpected
uncertainty specifically, rather than toward expected uncertainty or uncertainty broadly
(Chen & Lovibond, 2016). Though all individuals exhibit a greater aversion to ambiguity,
as compared to risk, when potential losses are high (Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphus, Tranel, &
Camerer, 2005), individuals with high IU may overvalue threat associated with ambiguity
and delay or avoid decision-making as a result (Hartley & Phelps, 2013).
Individual differences in cognitive control under uncertainty. Only one study
has examined cognitive control among those with high IU, however, a large body of
literature has emerged regarding cognitive control among those with anxiety disorders
and may inform our understanding of cognitive control related to IU specifically.
However, these studies primarily rely on threat and neutral paradigms, leaving little know
about cognitive processes under uncertainty. It is well established that individuals with
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anxiety disorders display characteristic attentional biases to threat (for a review see BarHaim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007). Attentional
biases are comprised of (1) facilitated attention toward threat, (2) difficulty in
disengagement from threat once identified and (3) attentional avoidance of threat (Cisler
& Koster, 2011). Attentional control and emotion regulation are the aspects of cognitive
control underlying difficulty in disengagement and attentional avoidance, respectively.
Attentional control is said to regulate bottom-up biases to threat, such that
individuals with anxiety disorders have weaker attentional control and therefore more
difficulty shifting attention away from threat once it has been identified (Derryberry &
Reed, 2002; Rueda, Posner, & Rothbart, 2011). Threat can refer to external stimuli or
internal cues, such as physiological and emotional experiences, or threatening imagery
(Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). This weakened attentional control is
present in neutral environments as well, and individuals with high trait anxiety are slower
to attend to relevant cues when incongruent, but non-threatening, distractors are present
(Bishop, 2009). Only one study has examined attentional differences in the context of IU.
Participants in this study completed an Attention Network Task which demonstrated
significant attentional differences between those with high and low IU such that
individuals with high IU demonstrated increased attentional biases (Fergus & Carleton,
2015).
Individual differences in the cognitive control of emotion under uncertainty.
Similarly, little is known about emotion regulation in the context of IU specifically. In the
only study of IU and ER, IU was associated with experiential avoidance and distress
about emotions even when controlling for negative affect, suggesting that worry and
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attentional avoidance may arise as a response to the internal states associated with
uncertainty (Lee, Orsillo, Roemer, & Allen, 2010). Emotion regulation among those with
GAD, the disorder most closely related to IU, has been widely studied however.
Individuals with anxiety disorders are much more likely to employ maladaptive emotion
regulation strategies that serve to maintain or increase emotional experiences (Turk,
Heimberg, Luterek, Mennin, & Fresco, 2005). Specifically, those with GAD show
increased intensity of emotions, greater reactivity to these emotions, and a reduced ability
to self-soothe once emotions are experienced (Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2005).
As described previously, negative affect facilitates controlled information processing. In
the case of highly anxious individuals, negative affect facilitates perseverative worry,
rather than productive deliberation (Dash, Meeten, & Davey, 2013). Worry has been
conceptualized as a maladaptive problem-solving process, whereby individuals respond
to problems with repetitive iterations of potential negative outcomes rather than
productively engaging in solution generation and selection (Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, &
Fresco, 2002). Evidence also suggests that worry may increase negative affect among
those with GAD (McLaughlin, Mennin, & Farach, 2007) and maintain emotional
disorders by preventing the productive processing of emotions (Newman, Llera,
Erickson, Przeworski, & Castonguay, 2013). Though individual differences in emotion
regulation among those with high IU warrants further investigation, the characterization
of emotion regulation among those with GAD may suggest that IU is also associated with
reliance on maladaptive emotion regulation strategies.
Integrating uncertainty processing and IU. Figure 2 represents a proposed
model through which dispositional IU contributes to maladaptive cognitive and emotional
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processing of uncertainty, increasing distress associated with uncertainty and reciprocally
maintaining high IU levels. Unlike Figure 1, Figure 2 begins with (1) IU, a factor which
increases vigilance toward uncertainty and (2) biases an individual’s likelihood of
perceiving uncertainty (Wever, Smeets, & Sternheim, 2015) due in part to lagging base
rate calculations of statistics in the environment. Therefore, (3) uncertainty may be
perceived in situations when those without high IU would not continue to perceive
uncertainty. As with all individuals, uncertainty leads to increased affect. In the case of
individuals with high IU, this affect arises more frequently, and is more likely to increase
negative affect in general and (4) anxiety specifically. Uncertainty increases anxiety,
which reciprocally increases perceptions of uncertainty. For individuals with high IU who
demonstrate difficulties with cognitive control and emotion regulation, uncertainty also
leads to maladaptive cognitive processing. (5) Worry, emotional and cognitive avoidance,
and emotional suppression arise in response to uncertainty and contribute to further
increases in or maintenance of anxiety. The anxious response to uncertainty coupled with
an increase in negative affect through maladaptive cognitive control and emotion
regulation leads to symptoms of psychopathology (e.g., emotional reactivity, avoidance,
repetitive negative thought) ultimately maintaining or increasing (1) intolerance of
uncertainty.
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Figure 2. A proposed model of the conditions under which maladaptive uncertainty
processing leads to the maintenance of IU.
IU in Children
Childhood IU is a relatively new field of study facilitated by the creation of the
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale for Children (IUSC; Comer et al., 2009).The IUSC is an
adaptation of the IUS with child and parent report versions. Though the IUSC
demonstrates acceptable reliability and validity, the measure may be difficult to complete
for young children. One study found that significantly fewer six to eight-year-olds were
able to complete the IUSC as compared to older children (Cowie, Clementi, & Alfano,
2016) suggesting that younger children may not be able to adequately reflect on and
report their reactions to uncertainty. This again highlights the methodological issue of
reliance on questionnaires to examine IU. One group has attempted to address this issue
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by creating a parent report questionnaire aimed at assessing very young children’s
behavior in uncertain situations (Sanchez et al., 2017).
Child IU characteristics. High IU in childhood is associated with GAD and, to a
lesser extent, other anxiety disorders as well (Hearn, Donovan, Spence, & March, 2017).
IUSC scores predict children’s self-reported anxiety severity (Read, Comer, & Kendall,
2013). A recent examination of the specific relation between childhood GAD and IU
revealed that children with GAD and another comorbid anxiety disorder had the highest
levels of IU as compared to children with pure GAD or another anxiety disorder. This
study also found that worry but not GAD predicted increases in IU beyond the effects of
overall anxiety (Cowie et al., 2016). This result suggests that IU in childhood may be
more related to underlying cognitive and emotional processes, rather than to diagnoses
themselves. Through development, IU may eventually relate directly to psychopathology,
as is seen in adults with emotional disorders. However, given the association between IU
and GAD found in previous studies, further research is required to test this hypothesis.
Studies of child IU in relation to cognitive and emotional processes have
primarily focused on extending adult models of IU to child populations. These studies
have found that, as in adults, child IU and worry are significantly and uniquely related as
compared to similar psychological constructs (Fialko, Bolton, & Perrin, 2012; Kertz &
Woodruff-Borden, 2013). Though IU seems to be a causal factor in anxiety symptoms
among adults, the relation appears bidirectional among adolescents. A five-year
longitudinal study of worry and IU among adolescents found that worry mediated IU
over time and IU also mediated worry over time. Thus, IU and worry impact each other
reciprocally in adolescence. Those who are still developing may learn worry as a
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response to uncertainty, while, reciprocally, worry makes uncertainty less tolerable
(Dugas, Laugesen, & Bukowski, 2012).
Beyond these studies, relatively little is known about children with high IU.
Because high IU is associated with increases in anxiety severity we can hypothesize that
uncertainty processing among children with greater anxiety may inform our
understanding of uncertainty processing among children with greater IU. It is very likely
that anxiety and IU, especially in childhood, are separable and arise from related but
different pathways. However, given the dearth of research on childhood IU, uncertainty
processing among children with high IU and anxious children are both examined here.
Individual differences in uncertainty processing among children. Converging
evidence from multiple methodologies suggests that differences in uncertainty processing
are associated with IU among children. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
results from youth with high and low IU suggest that differences in neural pathways
activated during uncertainty tasks are correlated with IU severity (Krain et al., 2008).
This study also showed that, among anxious youth who differ in IU severity but not
overall anxiety or worry levels, anxious youth with high IU show significantly delayed
RTs on uncertain decision-making tasks and greater activity in brain areas associated
with uncertainty processing than anxious youth with low IU. RTs on uncertainty tasks are
predictive of IU levels but are not sufficiently predictive of anxiety symptoms among
children (Brown et al., 2014). It is possible that differences in RTs are related to
uncertainty processing differences rather than the interference of anxiety among anxious
children.
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Child anxiety disorders and maladaptive uncertainty processing. Children with
anxiety disorders experience characteristic emotional, emotion regulation and cognitive
differences as compared to non-anxious children. Children with anxiety disorders tend to
experience negative emotions more often than peers and are more reactive to these
emotions (Tan et al., 2012). They experience difficulty regulating their emotions and are
more likely to rely on suppression or avoidance rather than adaptive emotion regulation
skills (Folk, Zeman, Poon, & Dallaire, 2014). Emotion regulation has long been
considered a predictor of general childhood psychopathology (Keenan, 2000) and
reliance on suppression specifically in response to negative emotions causally contributes
to increased anxiety symptoms (Folk et al., 2014). This difficulty with top-down control
of emotions reflects difficulty with cognitive control overall for anxious children.
Children with anxiety disorders show executive attention dysfunction on par with
children diagnosed with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (Mogg et al., 2015).
Individual differences in cognitive control early in life are predictive of outcomes in
adulthood (Moffitt et al., 2011) and while cognitive control continues to develop into
young adulthood, individual differences remain stable (Miyake & Friedman, 2012). Thus,
individual differences in cognitive control among children with high IU predict lifelong
differences in cognitive control, and likely impact the development of psychopathology.
Child IU methods of study. IU in childhood is typically examined through use of
the IUSC and questionnaire measures of related factors such as anxiety and worry. Child
anxiety in these studies is quantified through use of questionnaires, such as the Revised
Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale(RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 1997), or
diagnostic interviews, such as the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV,
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child and parent versions(ADIS-IV-C/P; Albano & Silverman, 1996), while worry is best
captured with the Penn State Worry Questionnaire—Child Version (PSWQ-C; Chorpita,
Tracey, Brown, Collica, & Barlow, 1997). Studies have primarily relied on crosssectional data to examine the relation between IU and psychopathology symptoms, and
the characteristics of those with high IU (Osmanagaoglu, Creswell, & Dodd, 2017). One
study has examined IU and related factors longitudinally to test the dispositional nature
of IU and the causal nature of IU in relation to psychopathology symptoms (Dugas et al.,
2012). Only one study has employed an experimental task to examine the behavioral
correlates of IU in children. Children in this study completed a decision-making game
with varying uncertainty conditions, and were asked to rate their anxiety and subjective
certainty following the game. This study also used functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (fMRI) to identify separable patterns of neural activation related to uncertainty
processing that distinguished children with high and low IU (Krain et al., 2008).
Other studies of uncertainty processing in childhood exist, but have not measured
IU or examined individual differences in uncertainty processing. These studies typically
employ decision-making paradigms that vary based on the following domains. Among
decision-making studies that do not include emotional components, a task may be
presented that varies based on the number of distractors or the salience of the cue. The
task typically also contains a probabilistic component, whereby known and unknown
probabilities are varied to measure differences between these conditions. When emotion
is integrated into a decision-making study, emotion may be incidental or integral to the
task. Incidental emotions are typically induced prior to decision-making, while integral
emotions may involve making a decision about the value of threatening or neutral stimuli.
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Across these studies, measured outcomes include: RT and accuracy under varied
conditions; neural activation associated with valuation or probabilistic computation; and
eye-tracking data indicating how children attend to environments and process information
when making decisions.
The Current Study
Though current studies have provided valuable evidence concerning the
characteristics of children with high IU, several limitations are present. Little is known
about how IU impacts individuals’ behavior under uncertainty, and even less is known
about how children with high IU behave under uncertainty. While the link between
psychopathology and IU is well established, and interventions targeting IU have shown
preliminary success in reducing psychopathology symptoms, it is yet unclear why this
relation exists. It is likely that individuals with high IU employ maladaptive behavioral
and cognitive processes when faced with uncertainty that contribute to the emergence of
psychopathology (Shihata et al., 2016). However, this theory remains untested due to the
paucity of research exploring the relations between IU and behavioral and cognitive
processes associated with uncertainty resolution and decision-making.
Pre-adolescence appears to be a critical period for developing the ability to
distinguish between threat and safety in the presence of ambiguous stimuli (Pine & Fox,
2015), and learning to demarcate clear threat categories by inhibiting fear responses to
ambiguous stimuli (J. Y. Lau et al., 2011). IU likely contributes to differences in
uncertainty processing, which increase distress in the presence of uncertainty, and
reciprocally maintain IU. Understanding how those with high IU respond to and process
uncertainty and ambiguously threatening stimuli in childhood, prior to the maturation of
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cognitive control, may inform our understanding of how IU and broad psychopathology
relate, and how clinical interventions can target IU across disorders and among those with
comorbidities. The current study aims to begin addressing gaps in our knowledge of the
individual differences in behaviors and cognitive processes associated with IU and
psychopathology symptoms in childhood. As IU most strongly relates to anxiety
disorders, the proposed study examines IU in children with and without anxiety disorders,
and related symptoms, specifically.
Study aims and hypotheses.
Aim 1. Examine the behavioral and cognitive correlates of high IU in children.
Hypothesis 1. Child IU will predict behavior and attention on a decision-making
task, such that higher IU will be associated with slower RTs, more time spent looking at
distractors, and more incorrect responses. Child IU will also predict differences in
executive function and ER, such that high IU will be associated with weaker attentional
and emotional control.
Aim 2. Understand how ambiguous threat affects behavior and cognition for
children with high IU, as compared to overtly threatening or neutral conditions.
Hypothesis 2. Children with high IU will exhibit slower RTs, spend more time
looking at distractors, and respond incorrectly more often in ambiguous environments as
compared to overtly threatening or neutral conditions, while children with low IU will not
experience differences by condition.
Aim 3. Test the hypothesized link between IU and anxiety disorder symptoms in
childhood.
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Hypothesis 3a. Child IU will predict levels or worry and anxiety, such that higher
IU corresponds to higher worry and anxiety.
Hypothesis 3b. The relation between child IU and psychopathology symptoms
will be moderated by attentional and emotional control, such that higher IU will predict
weaker attentional and emotional control, which will predict higher worry and anxiety
levels.
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METHOD
Recruitment
This study was reviewed and approved by the University of Louisville’s Internal
Review Board (Approval # 16.0054). Families were recruited from schools and
throughout the Louisville community. Digital advertising was distributed through the
University of Louisville’s email announcement system. Flyers describing the study were
distributed to Jefferson County Public Schools (JCPS) personnel to distribute to parents
of children within the study’s targeted age range. Flyers were also distributed to Catholic
school personnel, other private school staff, and members of a local home-school cooperative. School personnel were encouraged to distribute flyers to parents of both
anxious and non-anxious children, as the study aimed to recruit a community sample.
Flyers were also posted in community locations such as coffee shops, libraries, and
pediatrician’s offices. Digital versions of study flyers were distributed on Facebook to
Louisville parenting groups. Flyers contained information about the study including a
brief description and study personnel contact information. To ensure recruitment of both
anxious and non-anxious youth, one version of the flyer described the study as an
investigation of worry in youth, while another version described the study as an
investigation of decision-making and emotions.
The required sample size was calculated a priori using GPower version 3.0.1
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Regarding hypotheses 1 and 2, large effect
sizes have been identified between measures of IU and decision-making behavioral tasks,
29

including response latencies (Thibodeau, Carleton, Gómez-Pérez, & Asmundson, 2013)
and accuracy (Carleton et al., 2016). Medium effect sizes have been identified among
children with anxiety disorders on go/no-go tasks measuring response inhibition (Wright,
Lipszyc, Dupuis, Thayapararajah, & Schachar, 2014). Medium effect sizes have also
been identified among children with anxiety disorders when comparing attentional bias in
threatening and neutral conditions (Dudeney, Sharpe, & Hunt, 2015). Regarding
hypothesis 3, large effect sizes have been identified in studies predicting worry and
anxiety from IUSC scores (Osmanagaoglu et al., 2017). To achieve power of .8, with α =
.05, a sample size of 42 was necessary to detect a medium to large effect size for
Hypotheses 1 and 3. To achieve power of .8, with α = .05, a sample size of 17 per IU
group, for a total of 34 participants, was necessary to detect a medium effect size for
Hypothesis 2. Thus, a total of 42 children were required for this study.
Procedure
Parents of eligible children were invited to schedule an appointment of
approximately three hours duration in the study’s research lab. Prior to their scheduled
appointment, parents were emailed a link to the consent form explaining the study
purpose and procedure. Study personnel contacted parents by telephone to explain the
consent and answer any questions. Once parents electronically signed the consent they
were directed to the study questionnaires and received a second email containing the
study assent for their child to sign. After the child signed the study assent they were
directed through the study questionnaires. Questionnaires were completed prior to the
appointment to lessen the burden of time each family spent in the research lab. Study
questionnaires and collected data were managed by REDCap, a HIPAA compliant
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research tool that allows each dyad’s data to be linked to a study identification number
for confidentiality. Questionnaires not completed at home were completed during the
appointment.
When families arrived for their appointment, consents and questionnaires were
checked for completeness, and questions about the measures were discussed.
Confidentiality was explained to children at a developmentally appropriate level. During
the appointment, children and parents individually completed the Anxiety Disorders
Interview Schedule for DSM-IV, child and parent versions (ADIS-IV-C/P). These
diagnostic interviews were administered by trained study personnel supervised by a
licensed clinical psychologist to determine the presence or absence of anxiety and related
disorders. Following the interviews, children completed an eye-tracking computer task.
Families were compensated for their time with a report regarding the results of the
diagnostic interviews, including the child’s anxiety status and social and emotional
functioning. Treatment referrals and recommendations were provided as appropriate for
children meeting diagnostic criteria.
Participants
Participants were 47 children 7 to 13 years old (M = 9.21, SD = 1.88) and their
parents. Eligibility was limited to children with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and
without any known developmental disabilities or delays or AttentionDeficit/Hyperactivity Disorder. Children were 21 boys (45%) and 26 girls (55%). The
majority of children were European American (89%) from households with a reported
annual income of $60,000 or more (75%). Twenty-three (50%) children met criteria for a
primary anxiety disorder diagnosis and 15 of these children met criteria for a secondary
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anxiety disorder diagnosis. Of the primary anxiety disorder diagnoses, generalized
anxiety disorder was the most common, N = 10, followed by social anxiety disorder, N =
6. Girls were significantly more likely to receive an anxiety disorder diagnosis, X2 (1, N =
45) = 5.02, p = .025.
Measures
Anxiety measures.
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV, child and parent versions
(ADIS-IV-C/P). Child diagnostic status was assessed using the ADIS-IV-C/P (Albano &
Silverman, 1996). The ADIS-IV-C/P assesses a broad range of anxiety, mood, and
externalizing disorders in youth (ages 7-17) and screens for the presence of additional
disorders including developmental, psychotic, and somatoform disorders. The ADIS-IVC/P also assesses age of onset, impairment and avoidance and has been described as the
premier instrument for assessing anxiety disorders in youth (Stallings & March, 1995).
Impairment ratings are generated for each diagnosis using the Clinician Severity Rating
(CSR, range = 0-8; ≥4 required to assign a diagnosis). The ADIS-IV-C/P possesses the
best psychometric profile for the diagnostic assessment of childhood anxiety disorders of
available diagnostic measures (Silverman & Nelles, 1988; Silverman, Saavedra, & Pina,
2001) and is sensitive to prevention and treatment effects (Dadds, Atkinson, Turner,
Blums, & Lendich, 1999; Kendall et al., 1997). Diagnoses are derived by the interviewer
based on child and parent report. Each ADIS-IV-C/P evaluation was supervised by a
licensed clinical psychologist and discrepancies were reconciled during supervision.
Beck Anxiety Inventory—Youth (BAI-Y). The BAI-Y is an adaptation of the
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck et al., 2005). The BAI-Y is a 20-item self-report
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scale measuring children’s anxious beliefs (e.g., “I am afraid that I might get sick”),
cognitions (e.g., “I worry I might go crazy”), and physiological responses (e.g., “My
hands shake”). Each item asks the child to respond with whether they experienced the
statement “never” “sometimes” “often” or “always” in the past two weeks. The BAI-Y
produces a raw score, which is transformed to a T-score using the child’s age and gender.
BAI-Y T-scores were used for all calculations in this study. The BAI-Y has demonstrated
convergent validity with other measures of anxiety in children, such as the RCMAS, as
well as high test-retest reliability (r = 0.64-0.88). The possible range of T-scores on this
measure is 31 to 100. Higher scores indicate higher levels of anxiety.
Penn State Worry Questionnaire—Child Version (PSWQ-C). The PSWQ-C is
an adaptation of the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Chorpita, Tracey, Brown,
Collica, & Barlow, 1997). The PSWQ-C is a 14-item self-report scale measuring worry
(e.g., “My worries really bother me,” “Many things make me worry”). Each item asks the
child to respond with whether a description is “never true,” “sometimes true,” “most
times true,” or “always true.” The PSWQ-C has demonstrated convergent validity with
other child worry measures, such as the Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale
Worry/Oversensitivity subscale, and high test-retest reliability (r = .92). The PSWQ-C
also demonstrates discriminant validity for children with and without clinical worry, and
between children with GAD and other anxiety disorders. Children with GAD report
significantly higher worry (M=24.09) than children with other anxiety disorders
(M=18.89) and healthy controls (M=12.96; Pestle, Chorpita, & Schiffman, 2008). The
possible range of scores on this measure is 0 to 42. Higher scores on this scale indicate
higher levels of worry.
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Temperament in Middle Childhood Questionnaire (TMCQ). The TMCQ is a
paper-and-pencil parent-report of temperament in children 7-10 years of age. The TMCQ
was based on the Children’s Behavior Questionnaire (CBQ; Rothbart et al., 2001), a wellestablished caregiver report measure of temperament for children 3-7 years old. The
TMCQ contains 16 scales comprised of 157 items and requires 20-25 minutes to
complete. Internal consistency for the parent-report ranges from .63 to .90. The Negative
Affect (NA) subscale was calculated according to the methodology by Kotelnikova,
Olino, Klein, Mackrell, and Hayden (2017).
Executive function measure.
Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function—Parent Form (BRIEF). The
BRIEF is an 86-item questionnaire, consisting of eight subscales (Gioia, Isquith, Guy, &
Kenworthy, 2000). Each item asks the parent to respond with whether a description is
“never true,” “sometimes true” or “often true” for their child. The eight-item Shift
subscale was used to measure attentional control. The Shift subscale measures the extent
to which a child can move attention freely and flexibly from one situation or task to
another (e.g., “Has a short attention span,” “Thinks too much about the same topic”).
Children low in Shift may experience more difficulty problem solving and be described
as inflexible or rigid. This subscale shows high test-retest reliability in both clinical and
normative samples. The possible range of scores on this scale is 8 to 24 and higher scores
on this measure indicate greater difficulty shifting attention. The 10-item Emotional
Control subscale was used to measure emotional control. The Emotional Control subscale
measures how well a child can regulate their own emotional responses to situations (e.g.,
“Becomes tearful easily,” “Angry or tearful outbursts are intense but end suddenly”).
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Children low in emotional control may display more frequent and dramatic mood
changes. The possible range of scores on this scale is 10 to 30, and higher scores indicate
more difficulty with emotional control. Though a new version of the BRIEF was recently
released, the updates to this measure primarily served to eliminate items that decreased
the sensitivity and specificity of identifying youth with attention-deficit/hyperactivity
disorder (BRIEF-2; Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2016). Thus, the original measure
was used in the current study.
Intolerance of Uncertainty measures.
The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale for Children (IUSC). The IUSC is an
adaptation of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Comer et al., 2009). The IUSC is
a 27-item self-report scale measuring negative emotional, cognitive and behavioral
reactions to uncertain situations and events (e.g., “Not knowing what will happen in the
future makes life hard, “Surprise events upset me greatly.”) Each item asks the child to
indicate how well a statement describes them on a scale from one to 5, where one is “Not
at all,” three is “Somewhat,” and five is “Very much.” The IUSC has demonstrated
convergent validity with measures of anxiety and worry including the Multidimensional
Anxiety Scale for Children (MASC) and the PSWQ-C. The IUSC has also demonstrated
acceptable utility in distinguishing youth with anxiety disorders from healthy controls,
with a cut score of 50 to 54 correctly classifying 80% of youth with anxiety disorders
(Comer et al., 2009). Youth with GAD tend to report higher levels of IU (M=66.61) than
youth with other anxiety disorders (M=59.49; Read et al., 2013). The possible range of
scores on this measure 27 to 135 with higher scores indicating higher levels of IU (Comer
et al., 2009).
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Modified attention task. A modified version of the Test Battery of Attention
Performance—Child Version (KITAP; Zimmermann, Fimm, & Gondan, 2002) was
completed by children in this study. Children completed this task in front of a television
screen positioned above a remote eye-tracker (EYE-TRAC 6 Desktop from Applied
Science Laboratories) and view a calibration event prior to completing the task. The task,
as adapted in Roebers, Schmid, and Roderer (2010), required children to respond (go) or
inhibit response (no-go) based on a target stimuli, while ignoring distractor stimuli. The
stimuli consisted of an underwater scene in which a submarine (containing the target)
was attempting to return to the surface surrounded by sharks and dolphins (distractors).
Past eye-tracking studies of attention and anxiety have used images of sharks to elicit
emotion among both anxious and non-anxious adults and youth (Finucane & Power,
2010; Kempe, Rookes, & Swarbrigg, 2013; Allison M. Waters, Wharton, ZimmerGembeck, & Craske, 2008). In this version of the KITAP, distractor stimuli were either
neutral (two dolphins with happy faces), threatening (two sharks with angry faces) or
ambiguous (one happy dolphin and one angry shark). Children were told to help the
submarine return to the surface by pressing the space bar with their dominant hand as fast
as they could when the porthole turned green, and waiting when the porthole turned red.
Each trial began with a fixation period of 800 ms during which the scenery and
submarine appeared, then a distractor period of 400 ms during which the two distractors
were present, then a target period of 800 ms during which the porthole changed to green
or red. Children had a chance to practice with 12 trials (four neutral, four threatening,
four distractors) after instructions, then completed three blocks of 12 trials, of which half
were “go” and half were “no-go”.
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Accuracy and response latencies were recorded, as well as time spent looking at
the areas of interest (AOIs; i.e., target, threatening distractor, neutral distractor). Though
the original task examined only accuracy and response latencies, recent research suggests
that eye tracking indices of attentional bias are more reliable indicators than RT (Gibb,
Mcgeary, & Beevers, 2016). Further, the use of both RTs and eye movement allows for
examination of bias in both covert and overt attention (Weierich, Treat, & Hollingworth,
2008). Dwell duration (i.e., time spent looking within an AOI) was examined as a
proportion with the cumulative dwell duration for each AOI divided by the total dwell
duration over the course of the task to account for individual differences in total dwell
duration not related to the variables of interest (e.g., data lost due to blink, head shift,
etc.). This approach to data reduction has been used previously in studies investigating
controlled aspects of visual attention among anxious youth (Price et al., 2016; Shechner
et al., 2017).
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RESULTS
Preliminary Examination of Measures
Eye gaze data did not record for five children total: four due to hardware failure
and one due to prescription glasses worn during the study task that created a glare and
prevented accurate eye gaze recording. Additionally, two parents did not complete the
entire demographic questionnaire. Little’s Missing Completely at Random (MCAR;
Little, 1988) test was nonsignificant, p = .40, indicating that data were MCAR. Missing
data were therefore addressed using pairwise deletion (Beaujean, 2012).
Preliminary Analysis
Descriptive statistics. Means and standard deviations for the current sample are
displayed in Table 1.
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Table 1. Sample Characteristics and Independent Samples T Tests Comparing Children
with and without Anxiety Disorders on Study Measures
Sample Mean (SD)

Anxious (SD)

Non-anxious (SD)

T

IUS-C

61.43 (21.53)

72.02 (20.57)

51.16 (17.38) -3.90***

BAI-Y-T

51.22 (10.54)

56.17 (7.89)

46.36 (10.89) -3.78***

PSWQ-C

18.83 (9.10)

24.83 (5.90)

13.05 (7.80) -6.09***

BRIEF-Shift

13.77 (3.95)

15.72 (3.49)

11.72 (3.40) -4.06***

BRIEF-EC

18.71 (5.84)

21.61 (5.00)

15.68 (5.13) -4.07***

TMCQ-NA

2.44 (0.55)

2.66 (0.38)

2.24 (0.61) -3.83***

Note. IUS-C = Intolerance of Uncertainty Questionnaire—Child; BAI-Y-T = Beck Anxiety Inventory for
Youth T-score; PSWQ-C = Penn State Worry Questionnaire for Children; BRIEF = Behavior Rating
Inventory of Executive Function; EC = Emotional Control; TMCQ-NA = Temperament in Middle
Childhood Questionnaire—Negative Affect subscale.
*** p < .001

The IUS-C demonstrated excellent reliability in the current sample (Cronbach’s α
= .94). Children with anxiety disorders reported IUS-C scores somewhat higher than past
investigations of children with any anxiety disorder (i.e., M = 64.97) and comparable to
studies of children with multiple comorbid anxiety disorders (i.e., M = 71.69; Cowie,
Clementi, & Alfano, 2016) while the non-clinical children reported IUS-C scores
comparable to non-anxious community youth (i.e., M = 52.81; Comer et al., 2009). The
BAI-Y demonstrated good reliability (Cronbach’s α = .87). Children with anxiety
disorders reported BAI-Y T-scores comparable to past studies of children with a principal
anxiety diagnosis (i.e., M = 59.00) and non-clinical children reported scores comparable
to past samples of non-anxious youth (i.e., M = 48.20; Beck, Beck, Jolly, & Steer, 2005).
The PSWQ-C demonstrated excellent reliability in the current sample (Cronbach’s α =
.90). Children with anxiety disorders reported PSWQ-C scores comparable to past studies
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of youth with a diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder (i.e., M = 24.09) and nonclinical children reported scores comparable to past samples of youth without an anxiety
diagnosis (i.e., M = 12.96; Pestle, Chorpita, & Schiffman, 2008).
The BRIEF demonstrated excellent reliability (Cronbach’s α = .98) overall. The
Shift subscale demonstrated good reliability (Cronbach’s α = .84) while the EC subscale
demonstrated excellent reliability (Cronbach’s α = .93). No psychometric norms are
available for anxious samples, however, the Shift (i.e., M = 11.34-11.99) and EC (i.e., M
= 14.81-16.39) subscale scores in the non-anxious group were comparable to community
samples (Gioia et al., 2000). The TMCQ demonstrated excellent reliability (Cronbach’s α
= .91). No psychometric norms are available for the TMCQ, however, means in the
current sample were comparable to community samples (i.e., M = 2.32-3.66;
Kotelnikova et al., 2017).
Independent samples t-tests indicated that child gender was related to PSWQ-C
score such that girls reported significantly more worry than boys, t(45) = -2.47, p = .017.
Child gender was also related to TMCQ and BRIEF-Shift scores such that girls
demonstrated significantly greater negative affect, t(45) = -2.32, p = .025, and
significantly greater difficulties with attentional control than boys, t(45) = -2.03, p = .049.
Child gender was related to target dwell duration, t(40) = -2.34, p = .032, such that girls
were relatively less likely to attend to the target and ignore distractors as compared to
boys, and marginally related to RT, t(45) = -1.99, p = .053, such that girls were relatively
slower to respond than boys. Child age was not related to any study variables. Child
gender was held as a covariate throughout hypothesis testing.
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Negative affect (NA) is considered a higher-order, temperamental trait that
predicts IU (Carleton, 2016) and anxiety disorder symptoms (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012.
Because temperament represents stable individual differences in emotion, cognition, and
behavior across environments, NA was explored as a possible control variable. The
relation between RT and NA was marginally significant, r(45) = .28, p = .067, however,
when controlling for gender this relation became nonsignificant p =.41. NA did not
predict any other task variables (i.e., dwell durations, accuracy) and so it was not used in
further analyses.
Model assumptions. Normality of the variables was assessed by inspecting
histograms and through use of skewness and kurtosis z-scores. All questionnaire scores
(i.e., IUS-C, BAI-Y T, PSWQ-C, BRIEF, TMCQ) were normally distributed. RTs
exhibited positive skew, which was appropriately reduced with logarithmic
transformations. Dwell durations on distractors also exhibited positive skew, which was
appropriately reduced with logarithmic transformations. Target dwell duration exhibited
negative skew, which was appropriately reduced with an arcsine transformation.
Transformed variables were used for hypothesis testing.
Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 1: IU predicts behavior and attention. Bivariate correlations
conducted between IUS-C scores, covariates, and task outcome variables are displayed in
Table 2.
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Table 2. Correlation Coefficients Between IUS-C, Task Outcomes, and Covariates
Behavior
IUS-C

Accuracy

RT

Attention

Covariates

Target dwell Threat dwell Neutral dwell Age

Gender

IUS-C
-.22

RT

.36*

.02

Target dwell

-.34*

.03

.08

Threat dwell

.32*

-.06

.04

-.84**

Neutral dwell

.29

-.09

-.17

-.85**

.58**

Age

-.04

.24

-.25

-.12

.07

.10

Gender

.20

.31

.31*

.15

-.17

-.10

Note. IUS-C = Intolerance of uncertainty questionnaire—child; RT = Overall average RT
*p < .05, ** p < .01
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Accuracy

-.16

IUS-C was related to average overall RT, r(47) = .36, p = .012, target dwell
duration, r(42) = -.34, p = .015, and threat dwell duration, r(42) = .32, p = .043.
Hierarchical linear regressions were conducted to explore these relations controlling for
gender. IUS-C explained a significant proportion of variance in RT, R2 = .17, F(2, 44) =
4.24, β = .32, p = .028. IUS-C significantly predicted target dwell duration, R2 = .097,
F(2, 39) = 3.74, β = -.41, p = .011, and threat dwell duration, R2 = .10, F(2, 39) = 4.38, β
= .35, p = .029.
Bivariate correlations conducted between IUS-C scores, BRIEF subscales, and
covariates are displayed in Table 3.

Table 3. Correlation Coefficients between Study Measures and Covariates
Anxiety symptoms
IUS-C

BAI-Y-T

PSWQ-C

BRIEF
Shift

EC

Covariates
Age

Gender

IUS-C
BAI-Y-T

.71**

PSWQ-C

.66**

.66**

Shift

.44**

.63**

.44**

EC

.49**

.59**

.39**

.76**

Age

-.04

.02

.05

-.13

-.10

Gender

.20

.24

.02*

-.31*

-.23

-.16

Note. IUS-C = Intolerance of uncertainty questionnaire—child; BAI-Y-T = Beck Anxiety Inventory for
Youth T-score; PSWQ-C = Penn State Worry Questionnaire for Children; EC = Emotional Control
*p < .05, ** p < .01
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IUS-C was related to Shift, r(47) = .44, p = .003, and EC, r(47) = .49, p = .001.
Hierarchical linear regressions indicated that, when controlling for gender differences,
IUS-C significantly predicted Shift, R2 = .24, F(2, 44) = 6.71, β = .40, p = .005, and EC,
R2 = .24, F(2, 44) = 13.29, β = .49, p = .001.
Hypothesis 2: High IU is associated with differences in attention and
behavior under ambiguously threatening conditions. To test differences in attention
and behavior by condition (i.e., threat, neutral, or ambiguous) for children with high and
low IU, a mean split of IUS-C scores was used to create two groups. 23 children with an
IUS-C score of 57 or below were coded as low IU and 24 children with an IUS-C score
of 58 or above were coded as high IU. Children in these groups did not differ by age,
t(45) = 0.47, p = .64, or gender, X2 (1, N = 47) = 1.02, p = .31. A repeated measures
mixed ANCOVA predicting RT from condition was not significant for the high, F(2, 68)
= 0.21, p = .81, or low IU groups, F(2, 65) = 0.078, p = .93. A repeated measures mixed
ANCOVA predicting target dwell duration by condition yielded a main effect of
condition in the high, F(2, 62) = 4.17, p = .022, but not low IU group, F(2, 56) = 0.50, p
= .61. Children in the high IU group were significantly more likely to attend to distractors
during the ambiguous condition as compared to the neutral condition, p = .026. The
difference between dwell duration in the ambiguous as compared to threat condition
approached but did not reach statistical significance, p = .080. Estimated marginal means
are presented in Figure 3.
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Low IU

1

Dwell Duration Proportion

Dwell Duration Proportion

1

0.9

0.9
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High IU

*
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0.7

0.7

0.6
Threat

Ambiguous

0.6
Neutral

Threat

Ambiguous

Neutral

Condition

Figure 3. Graphical representation of dwell duration proportion predicted by condition for
high and low IU groups.
Note. *p < .05
Hypothesis 3: IU predicts anxiety symptoms, moderated by attentional and
emotional control. Bivariate correlations conducted between IUS-C scores, anxiety
symptom scores, BRIEF subscales, and covariates are displayed in Table 3. IUS-C was
related to BAI-Y T-score, r(47) = .71, p < .001, and PSWQ-C score, r(47) = .66, p <
.001. Hierarchical linear regressions indicated that IUS-C significantly predicted BAI-Y
explained a significant proportion of variance in BAI-Y, R2 = .51, F(1,45) = 46.00, p <
.001. When controlling for gender differences, IUS-C significantly predicted PSWQ-C, β
= .65, p < .001, and explained a significant proportion of variance in PSWQ-C, R2 = .43,
F(2,44) = 16.70, p < .001.
Moderational models were tested predicting anxiety symptoms from IUS-C with
BRIEF subscales as moderators, with gender as a covariate. Shift, R2 = .0023, F(1, 42)
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= 0.19, p = .67, and EC, R2 = .028, F(1, 42) = 2.41, p = .13, failed to moderate the
relation between IUS-C and BAI-Y T-score. Shift, R2 = .0036, F(1, 42) = 0.41, p = .52,
and EC, R2 = .0002, F(1, 42) = 0.016, p = .90, also failed to moderate the relation
between IUS-C and PSWQ-C.
Exploratory Analyses
Anxiety disorder symptoms. Given the significant relation between IUS-C and
anxiety symptoms found in the current sample and in past studies (Osmanagaoglu et al.,
2017), the relation between task outcome variables and anxiety symptoms was explored.
Bivariate correlations conducted between BAI-Y T-scores, PSWQ-C scores, covariates,
and task outcome variables are displayed in Table 4.
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Table 4. Correlation Coefficients between Anxiety Symptom Measures, Task Outcomes, and Covariates
Anxiety symptoms
BAI-Y-T

PSWQ-C

Behavior
Accuracy

RT

Attention

Covariates

Target

Threat

Neutral

dwell

dwell

dwell

Age Gender

BAI-Y-T
.66**

Accuracy

-.03

.08

RT

.20

.44**

.02

Target dwell

-.23

-.27

.03

.08

Threat dwell

.03

.29

-.06

.04

-.84**

Neutral dwell .26

.22

-.09

-.17

-.85**

.58**

Age

-.02

.05

.24

-.25

-.12

.07

.10

Gender

.24

.35*

.31

.31*

.15

-.17

-.10
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PSWQ-C

-.16

Note. BAI-Y-T = Beck Anxiety Inventory for Youth T-score; PSWQ-C = Penn State Worry Questionnaire for Children; RT = Overall average RT
*p < .05, ** p < .01

PSWQ-C was related to average overall RT, r(47) = .44, p = .002. BAI-Y was not
related to any task outcome variables. A hierarchical linear regression indicated that,
when controlling for gender differences, PSWQ-C significantly predicted RT, R2 = .22,
F(2,44) = 6.14, β = .38, p = .011.
A 2 (diagnostic group) x 3 (condition) repeated measures mixed ANCOVA
yielded a main effect of diagnostic group, F(1, 141) = 12.97, p < .001, but not condition,
F(2, 141) = 0.12, p = .89, on RT. The anxious group demonstrated significantly slower
RTs across conditions as compared to the non-anxious group, p < .001. A 2 (diagnostic
group) x 3 (condition) repeated measures mixed ANCOVA did not indicate a main effect
for diagnostic group, F(1, 126) = 0.21, p = .65, or condition, F(2, 126) = 1.10, p = .34, on
target dwell duration.
Correlations between IUS-C and task outcome variables were also investigated in
the anxious and non-anxious groups separately. Pearson’s r values are displayed in Table
5.

Table 5. Correlations Coefficients between IUS-C and Task Outcomes by Group
IUS-C
Anxious

Non-anxious

Target dwell

-.17

-.52*

Threat dwell

.15

.30

Neutral dwell

.04

.44*

Reaction time

.35

-.02

Note. *p < .05
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In the non-anxious group only IUS-C predicted target dwell duration, r(22) = -.52,
p = .017, and dwell duration on neutral distractors, r(22) = .44, p = .017. No task
variables were related to IUS-C in the anxious group.
Reaction time variability. Previous research has indicated that greater RT
variability is associated with less effective cognitive control (Ode, Robinson, & Hanson,
2011), including lapses in on-task attention (Vaurio, Simmonds, & Mostofsky, 2009), and
less efficient information processing (Karalunas & Huang-Pollock, 2013). Because
higher IUS-C score predicted increased distraction during the task, the relation between
IUS-C score and RT variability was explored. Ex-Gaussian models were fit to each
child’s RT distribution using the ‘retimes’ package in R statistical software (Massidda,
2013). Tau (τ), a measure of variability due to increases in the distribution tail, was
examined (Whelan, 2008). Increases in τ indicate longer infrequent RTs rather than
overall slowed processing speed (Balota & Yap, 2011). IUS-C score significantly
predicted τ, R2 = .09, F(1, 45) = 4.68, p = .036, β = .31. RT distributions for high and low
IU groups are displayed in Figure 4.
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Frequency

High IU
Low IU

Reaction time
Figure 4. Reaction time distributions by IU group.
Fixation duration skewness. Skewness of fixation duration distributions is
related to individual differences in task processing, where greater positive skewness
indicates decreased cognitive control ability (Henderson, Choi, Luke, & Schmidt, 2018)
and less effortful cognitive processing of a scene (Luke & Henderson, 2016), and lesser
positive skewness indicates goal-oriented scene viewing (Hartwig, Schnitzspahn, Kliegel,
Velichkovsky, & Helmert, 2013). Because IUS-C and anxiety symptoms in the current
sample were related to cognitive control measures, IUS-C and anxiety symptoms were
examined in relation to the skewness value of each participant’s fixation duration
distribution. To control for multiple comparisons, a Bonferroni corrected alpha value of
.017 (critical α level = .05/3 = .017) was used. PSWQ-C significantly predicted skew,
R2 = .16, F(1, 40) = 7.02, p = .012, β = .40, such that higher PSWQ-C score predicted an
increase in the number of short fixations, but IUS-C, p = .53, and BAI-Y, p = .64, did not.
Fixation duration distributions for high and low worry groups are displayed in Figure 5.
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Frequency

High worry
Low worry

Fixation duration (ms)
Figure 5. Fixation duration distribution for high and low worry groups.
IU and attention over time. To further explore information processing
differences, dwell duration was separated into two time bins representing the first and
second half of the task. Dwell duration proportion on target was calculated for each
condition (i.e., ambiguous, threat, and neutral). A 2 (IU group) x 2 (time) repeated
measures mixed ANCOVA predicting dwell duration proportion for ambiguous
conditions yielded a significant interaction between IU group and time, F(1, 84) = 4.053,
p = .047. Pairwise comparisons revealed that this interaction was driven by a significant
difference in dwell during the first half of the task. The high IU group spent significantly
more time attending to distractors in ambiguous conditions during the first half of the task
as compared to the low IU group, F(1, 84) = 16.61, p < .001. The IU groups did not
significantly differ in the second half of the task, p = .074. No significant main or
interaction effects were identified when predicting dwell duration proportion during
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neutral or threat conditions, ps > .084. Estimated marginal means for dwell duration
proportion in ambiguous conditions are presented in Figure 6.

Dwell Duration Proportion

1

*
Low IU

0.9

High IU
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0.7
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1
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Time
Figure 6. Graphical representation of dwell duration proportion in ambiguous conditions
predicted by IU group by time.
Note. *p < .05
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DISCUSSION
The current study examined the relation between IU and behavioral and cognitive
aspects of decision-making among children with and without anxiety disorders. IU is a
transdiagnostic, trait-like risk factor for the development of psychopathology and
interventions that target IU have shown promise in effectively reducing disorder
symptoms among those with emotional disorders and comorbid conditions. While it is
well established that IU predicts a range of disorder symptoms, it is unclear what
mechanisms drive this relation. This is likely due, in part, to the paucity of research
examining correlates of IU at behavioral and physiological levels of analysis. Even fewer
studies examining these aspects of IU in childhood exist, limiting our knowledge of the
impact of IU on the development of cognitive and emotional processing differences that
underlie emotional disorders (e.g., weaker attentional control, emotional dysregulation,
etc.).
The aim of the current study was to begin addressing these gaps by examining
how children with higher IU resolve uncertainty. The study hypothesized that IU is
associated with individual differences in decision-making that may contribute to the
development of psychopathology. Specifically, it was hypothesized that children with
higher IU would exhibit increased evaluation of available information, delays in decisionmaking, and reduced accuracy, and that these differences would be greater in the
presence of ambiguous information. It was also expected that IU would predict greater
deficits in the aspects of higher-order cognitive control that support decision-making
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under uncertainty, namely emotional and attentional control, and these differences would
moderate the relation between IU and disorder symptoms.
Preliminary Analyses
Preliminary analyses revealed that the current sample exhibited somewhat higher
rates of GAD than expected within the anxiety disorder group. Previous epidemiological
studies indicate that specific phobias, separation anxiety, and social anxiety are the most
prevalent anxiety disorders diagnosed prior to age 14 (Merikangas et al., 2011), however,
others indicate that GAD may be the most prevalent childhood anxiety disorder, followed
by separation and panic disorders (Copeland, Angold, Shanahan, & Costello, 2014).
Increased prevalence of GAD in the current sample is likely due to recruitment
procedures. Recruitment for the present study focused on identifying children with
chronic and impairing worry, rather than anxiety broadly, as the present study was
interested in recruiting children with a range of IU levels and IU exhibits a particularly
strong association with worry, as compared to physiological or behavioral symptoms of
anxiety (Donovan, Holmes, Farrell, & Hearn, 2017). Some evidence exists for the
separation of child anxiety disorders into distress (i.e., GAD) and fear (i.e., specific
phobias, separation anxiety disorder, and social anxiety disorder) disorders based on
findings that children with distress disorders exhibit hypervigilance towards threat, while
children with fear disorders show attentional avoidance of threat (A. M. Waters, Bradley,
& Mogg, 2014). This is also consistent with the finding of increased attention to
threatening distractors in the current study’s sample. Results of the current study may be
limited in their generalizability to fear disorders based on the sample characteristics.
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Preliminary analyses also revealed several gender differences in the current
sample. Girls were more likely to meet criteria for an anxiety disorder. This is consistent
with past examinations of gender differences among childhood anxiety disorders
(Broeren, Muris, Diamantopoulou, & Baker, 2013; Crocetti, Klimstra, Keijsers, Hale, &
Meeus, 2009). It is unclear why gender differences in childhood anxiety disorder
prevalence exist, though it has been theorized that emotion socialization and other
relevant parenting factors play a role (Zahn-Waxler, Shirtcliff, & Marceau, 2008). Of
note, gender differences have not been identified for the age of onset or chronicity of
anxiety disorders in past studies (Mclean, Asnaani, Litz, & G, 2011). Girls in the current
sample also exhibited significantly higher levels of negative affect. Previous studies have
not identified gender differences in negative affect (Hirshfeld-Becker et al., 2008), but it
has been suggested that girls and boys with high negative affect may experience
differential emotion socialization parenting practices that contribute to differences in the
development of anxiety disorder symptoms (Brumariu & Kerns, 2015). Girls in the
current sample also exhibited significantly greater difficulties with attentional control.
Small gender differences in attentional control have been identified in the opposite
direction in previous studies, with boys having relatively greater attentional control
difficulties than girls (Huizinga & Smidts, 2011).
Gender differences in negative affect and attentional control in the current study
are likely due to the gender differences in anxiety disorder rates. Gender was held as a
covariate throughout hypothesis testing to account for these differences. Given the
possible differences in parenting that interact with gender to predict disorder symptoms,
it is possible that parenting interacts with gender in the relation between IU and disorder
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symptoms as well. That is, emotional socialization of girls with high IU may impact the
pathway between uncertainty processing and the development of an anxiety disorder
differently than the emotional socialization of boys with high IU. Examining parenting
and gender in future studies of childhood IU may further explain the relation between this
risk factor and disorder symptoms.
Age was not associated with any study variables, as expected, given the narrow
age range used in this study. While inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility improve
throughout childhood (Diamond, 2014) and, specifically, BRIEF Shift and Emotional
Control scores decrease significantly, this tends to occur over a broader age range (i.e.,
from ages 5 to 14; Huizinga & Smidts, 2011). The nonsignificant relation found here may
indicate that a relatively restricted age range was used. Most participants in the current
sample fell between the ages of 8 and 12. Identifying significant changes in emotional
and attentional control may require the use of a broader age range. It is also possible that
the impact of age on the executive function domains investigated here have small effect
sizes that could not be detected by the current study’s sample size.
Hypothesis Testing
Behavior and IU during decision-making. Behavior in the present study was
operationalized as RT and accuracy on Go trials during the study task. With regard to
behavior, the current study hypothesized that higher IU would be related to slower RTs
and reduced accuracy. This hypothesis was partially supported. Increases in IU
significantly predicted increases in RTs but not reductions in accuracy. The
nonsignificant relation between accuracy and IU was likely due to the restricted range of
errors on the study task. Of the 47 children who completed the task, 36 did not make any
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errors and the greatest number of errors made was 3 (i.e., 92% correct responses). This
was likely due to the relatively slow pace of the study task. Previous studies examining
accuracy and anxiety symptoms in children have reported similar issues and ultimately
omitted accuracy from study analyses (Brown et al., 2014). Thus, accuracy was omitted
from further analysis in the current study.
Past studies indicate that the presence of uncertainty engages bottom-up
emotional arousal and top-down cognitive control to facilitate decision-making. Increases
in uncertainty during experimental decision-making paradigms are associated with
slowed RTs across individuals, as uncertainty signals the need for controlled cognitive
processing rather than automatic responding (Fan et al., 2014). The degree to which an
individual adapts to increases in uncertainty and resumes efficient responding (i.e.,
decreased RT) following changes in uncertainty depends, in part, on the individual’s
physiological responsiveness to environmental cues (de Berker et al., 2016).
Physiological responses that accurately track uncertainty facilitate effective learning
processes, which allow for reductions in future uncertainty (FeldmanHall et al., 2016).
Individual differences in emotional and cognitive control responsiveness to
uncertainty may predict individual differences in decision-making under uncertainty,
including behavioral aspects of decision-making, such as RT. One study found that the
relation between inhibitory control and RT during a decision-making task was attenuated
by cue ambiguity, such that weaker inhibitory control predicted slower RTs only when
decision-making cues were ambiguous (Kalanthroff, Linkovski, Henik, Wheaton, &
Anholt, 2016). Another study found that increases in uncertainty predicted increases in
cognitive control, and, among youth specifically, IU predicted the magnitude of these
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increases. Youth with higher IU demonstrated increasing reactivity, rather than adaptive
responsiveness, as uncertainty increased (Krain et al., 2006). Further, increases in IU are
associated with diminished sensitivity of learning rates to outcome volatility during
decision-making (Browning, Behrens, Jocham, O’Reilly, & Bishop, 2015). In the present
study, higher IU may predict slowed RT because children with higher IU are more
emotionally reactive to uncertainty and less able to engage cognitive control processes
that are responsive to task demands during decision-making, contributing to difficulty
creating efficient response strategies during the task.
The current study also hypothesized that children with higher IU would exhibit
behavioral differences under different threat conditions. Specifically, it was hypothesized
that children with high IU would demonstrate significantly slower RTs for ambiguously
threatening, as compared to neutral and overtly threatening, conditions. This hypothesis
was not supported; children with high IU did not demonstrate differences in RT by
condition. While increased uncertainty slows RTs, past studies indicate that this
phenomenon is present regardless of the threat valence of uncertain cues (Speed, Jackson,
Nelson, Infantolino, & Hajcak, 2017). In the present study, individual differences in RT
may not have been affected by uncertainty arising from the threat valence of cues (i.e.,
the presence of threatening and neutral distractors), but from the uncertain probability of
seeing a Go cue (i.e., 50%), which remained stable throughout the task.
To further explore the relation between IU and behavior, RT variability was
examined. Given the hypothesized relation between IU and attention, and the relation
between attention and RT variability in past studies (e.g., Antonini, Narad, Landberg, &
Epstein, 2013), the current study hypothesized that a significant positive relation would
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exist between IU and RT variability. The data supported this hypothesis. Higher IU
predicted greater τ, indicating that the slower average RTs identified among children with
higher IU are due in part to increases in the RTs of the slowest, least frequent responses.
No studies have examined IU and RT variability, however, past studies indicate
that increases in τ are related to differences in attentional and emotional control (Sjöwall,
Roth, Lindqvist, & Thorell, 2013). τ is highly related to on-task behavior and successful
on-task attention among typically developing children (Antonini et al., 2013). The speed
of stimuli presented during a task also moderates the relation between τ and on-task
behavior, such that τ is a better indicator of inattention when stimuli are presented at a
relatively slower speed (Antonini et al., 2013), such as in the present study. Among
adults, RT variability, corrected for overall average RT speed, is associated with less
effective cognitive control and increases in negative emotion in daily life. Further, those
with higher RT variability report experiencing more adverse effects related to attentional
lapses in daily life (Ode et al., 2011). In the present study, the relation between IU and
RT may be driven by RT variability rather than overall slowed processing speed.
Children with higher IU may experience difficulty sustaining top-down goal directed
attention through the duration of the task, leading to periodic attentional lapses that yield
a small number of significantly slower responses, which ultimately increase their overall
average RT.
Behavior and anxiety symptoms during decision-making. Exploratory
analyses indicated that worry and anxiety symptoms exhibited a similar relation to RT as
that identified between RT and IU. Worry and anxiety symptoms predicted slower RTs,
and children with anxiety disorders did not demonstrate differences in RT by condition.
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Current literature regarding anxiety and RT remains extremely mixed, though some
studies suggest that slowed RTs only arise among anxious individuals in the presence of
threatening distractors, as the presence of threat increases anxiety, which interferes with
cognitive control (Van Bockstaele et al., 2014). As mentioned previously, studies of
anxious children have yielded weak effect sizes when predicting RT from anxiety
symptoms (Brown et al., 2014). One study found that attentional control and RT during a
go/no-go task was associated with intolerance of distress independent of actual distress
symptoms (i.e., anxiety and depressive symptoms; Macatee et al., 2018). Past studies
have also not identified a relation between RT variability and anxiety (Antonini et al.,
2013; Krain et al., 2008; Mogg et al., 2015).
Because past literature does not indicate that anxiety impacts RT, individual
differences in RT in the present study may be primarily due to IU rather than anxiety.
Further, past literature indicates that if differences in RT were driven by anxiety
symptoms, RTs would be slowed in the presence of threatening distractors. Anxious
children in the present study did not exhibit RT differences based on threat condition.
Attention and IU during decision-making. Attention in the present study was
operationalized as the proportion of time spent looking at areas of interest during the task
(i.e., dwell duration). With regard to attention, the current study hypothesized that higher
IU would be related to greater distraction during the task. This hypothesis was supported;
increases in IU predicted decreases in attention to the target and increases in attention to
threatening distractors. In the non-anxious group specifically, increases in IU predicted
increases in attention to neutral distractors.
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The current study also hypothesized that children with higher IU would exhibit
attentional differences under different threat conditions; specifically, that children with
high IU would demonstrate significantly greater distraction from the target during
ambiguously threatening, as compared to neutral and overtly threatening, conditions. This
hypothesis was supported, with children in the high IU group demonstrating significantly
less attention to the target under ambiguous conditions as compared to neutral conditions.
Attention to the target during ambiguous compared to threatening conditions trended
toward, but did not reach, significance among children with high IU, and no significant
differences were identified between attention to the target in threatening compared to
neutral conditions for children with high IU.
The relation between attention and threat condition was also examined over time.
It was hypothesized that children with high IU would be more distracted from the target
during the first half of the task as compared to children with low IU. This hypothesis was
supported for ambiguous conditions only. During ambiguously threatening trials, children
with high IU were more distracted than children with low IU in the first half of the task,
but not the second half of the task. There was no effect of time on attention between high
and low IU groups for threatening or neutral conditions.
The learned predictiveness and learned value of information modulates both
controlled and automatic visual attention (Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley, George, & Wills,
2016). Healthy individuals suppress attention to areas of visual scenes known to have a
high likelihood of containing distractors during decision-making so that the target can be
identified and attended to efficiently (Wang & Theeuwes, 2018a). Attentional
suppression of distractors occurs when the decision-maker accurately tracks the
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probabilities of distractors appearing across the visual scene and uses this statistical map
to identify locations most likely to contain distractors (Wang & Theeuwes, 2018b). Faster
RTs are associated with this type of distractor identification, while slower RTs are
associated with top-down identification of distractors based on representations stored in
working memory (Gaspar & McDonald, 2014).
Evidence of slower RTs and greater distraction together in the current study may
indicate that children with high IU are more reliant on stored representations of
distractors to identify and suppress attention to these stimuli. Because IU is associated
with difficulties learning the causal statistics of an environment, children with high IU in
the current study may have been less able to rely on probability based attentional
suppression and therefore more reliant on stored knowledge of visual cues. Increased
attention toward a stimulus is associated with increased fixation and dwell duration on
the stimulus (Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013). Visual stimuli matching stimuli stored in
visual working memory automatically capture attention, however, this effect can be
overcome by top-down attentional control (Kiss, Grubert, Petersen, & Eimer, 2012;
Sawaki & Luck, 2011). Thus, increased dwell duration on distractors in the current study
may indicate reliance on working memory representations of distractors coupled with
weak attentional control.
Healthy individuals update prior representations of visual scenes with current
information during repeated decision-making to accumulate knowledge and continually
hone response strategies over time (Behrens et al., 2007). Stimuli salience directs early
visual attention (Egeth, Leonard, & Leber, 2011), and motivationally salient stimuli (i.e.,
stimuli that signal reward or punishment) capture early visual attention even when the
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stimuli are not physically salient or task-relevant (Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths, &
Beesley, 2015; Nissens, Failing, & Theeuwes, 2017). As a task progresses, attentional
selectivity, through cognitive control and accumulated knowledge of the scene, allows for
a reduction in vulnerability to distraction (Theeuwes, 2010).
Children with higher IU may be particularly distracted by ambiguous information
because it is more salient to them. Individuals with higher IU experience errors as more
aversive, and, accordingly, more motivationally salient (Jackson, Nelson, & Hajcak,
2016). Ambiguous information may be particularly salient to children with higher IU
during early task trials because it serves as a cue for potential errors, and this
motivational salience may interfere with information processing based on the task
demands. Specifically, it may interfere with the process of identifying distractors as such.
Children with higher IU may take longer to create representations of ambiguous
environments because they have difficulty learning the value of information (i.e., whether
a stimulus is integral or irrelevant to the task goal) so that distractors can be identified,
and have more difficulty learning the statistical regularities of ambiguous environments
so that attention to the identified distractors can be suppressed.
Attention and anxiety symptoms during decision-making. Exploratory
analyses indicated that anxiety and worry were not related to greater distraction in the
current sample. This is consistent with current literature concerning anxiety and attention
among youth. Past studies have identified a robust attentional bias toward threat among
children with anxiety disorders (Puliafico & Kendall, 2006). However, this bias is only
identified during early attentional orienting (e.g., time to initial fixation) and has not been
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identified during sustained attentional processes (e.g., dwell duration; Shechner et al.,
2013).
Exploratory analyses also indicated that worry, but not IU or anxiety, was related
to fixation duration skewness, such that children who reported higher levels of worry
exhibited a greater number of short fixations during the study task. While research
concerning individual differences in fixation duration distribution is limited, evidence
from eye-tracking studies of both scene viewing and reading suggests that greater fixation
durations are under cognitive control, while shorter fixation durations are not (Henderson
et al., 2018; Kardan et al., 2015; Luke & Henderson, 2016). Evidence from eye-tracking
studies of student attention and learning outcomes also indicates that increases in fixation
duration skew are associated with mind wandering, where individuals begin to exhibit a
greater number of shorter fixations just prior to an episode of off-task mind wandering
(Hutt, Mills, White, Donnelly, & D’Mello, 2016). Further, investigations of the
functional connectivity differences between worry and anxiety indicate that, while
anxiety is associated with impoverished attentional control, worry is uniquely related to
differences in Default Mode functioning, the network of brain areas associated with offtask, self-referential thought, and specifically to mind-wandering (Forster, Elizalde,
Castle, & Bishop, 2015). While conclusions about this finding are preliminary, it is
possible that the association between fixation duration skewness and worry may indicate
that children who were distracted by their worries during the task exhibited gaze
distributions similar to those associated with mind wandering.
IU, cognitive control, and anxiety symptoms. It was hypothesized that children
with higher IU would have greater cognitive control difficulties and increased anxiety
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symptoms, and that cognitive control would moderate the relation between IU and
anxiety symptoms. The first two of these hypotheses were supported; children in the
current study who reported greater IU were rated by their parents as having greater
difficulties with attentional and emotional control in daily life, and children who reported
greater IU also reported increased worry and anxiety. The third hypothesis was not
supported; attentional and emotional control did not moderate the relation between
Cognitive and neuroimaging literature provides evidence for the role of brain
areas associated with emotional and attentional control in decision-making under
uncertainty (Mushtaq et al., 2011). The ability to use emotion as information (Marroquin,
Boyle, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Stanton, 2016) and deploy adequate attention to incoming,
task-relevant information (Kool, Shenhav, & Botvinick, 2017) supports learning under
uncertainty (Abrahamse, Braem, Notebaert, & Verguts, 2016). Brain areas associated
with the processing and regulation of somatic-emotional cues are associated with
subjective perceptions of uncertainty specifically (Stern, Gonzalez, Welsh, & Taylor,
2010). Difficulties with attentional and emotional control may contribute to increased
perceptions of uncertainty and difficulty resolving uncertainty, which drive the aversive
reactions to and negative beliefs about uncertainty that underlie IU (Grupe & Nitschke,
2013).
IU in the current study was associated with individual differences in decisionmaking processes under uncertainty. The differences in behavior and attention identified
among children with higher IU in the current study may arise because these children have
difficulty with higher order attentional and emotional control. Specifically, difficulty
regulating the emotional reactions elicited by uncertainty may diminish the use of
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emotions as information in decision-making and increase perceptions of uncertainty,
reciprocally increasing emotional reactivity (Chin, Nelson, Jackson, & Hajcak, 2016).
Biased uncertainty calculations coupled with weaker attentional control may interfere
with the ability to update learning rates according to task demands, allow for lapses in ontask attention toward task-irrelevant information, and ultimately result in inefficient
decision-making behaviors.
The relation between IU and anxiety symptoms among youth is a robust finding
(Osmanagaoglu et al., 2017) that was replicated in the current study. Cognitive control
did not moderate this relation. Previous studies have established that childhood anxiety
disorders are characterized by deficits in emotion regulation (Bender, Reinholdt-Dunne,
Esbjørn, & Pons, 2012; Carthy, Horesh, Apter, & Gross, 2010) and attentional control
(Kertz, Belden, Tillman, & Luby, 2016; Lau & Waters, 2017). It is possible that
attentional and emotional control play a mediational role in the relation between IU and
anxiety, where IU predicts anxiety symptoms because it is associated with emotional and
attentional weaknesses, however, the current study’s cross-sectional design precludes
testing this hypothesis.
Implications for the Impact of IU on Development and Anxiety Symptoms
Results of the current study have implications for models of IU across
development. Past studies show that the cognitive and emotional processing of
uncertainty is separable from the processing of threat (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). IU
likely arises from individual differences in uncertainty processing specifically, which
contribute to distress in the presence of uncertainty even in the absence of threat
(Pepperdine, Lomax, & Freeston, 2018). In non-threatening, uncertain environments
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individuals with anxiety disorders have difficulty determining whether an unexpected
outcome is due to a true change in the likelihood of a cue-outcome relationship or
whether it represents statistical randomness (Huang, Thompson, & Paulus, 2017). As a
result, they tend to adjust learning rates based on irrelevant outcomes and have difficulty
creating accurate representations of uncertain environments, contributing to uncertainty
about uncertainty (Bach, Hulme, Penny, & Dolan, 2011). During decision-making, these
adults tend to avoid information-poor options (Bishop & Gagne, 2018) and reduce time
spent evaluating options under uncertainty (Luhmann, Ishida, & Hajcak, 2011),
indicating that IU may be related to avoidance of uncertainty.
If IU is related to uncertainty avoidance, IU in childhood may interfere with the
development of uncertainty processing skills by restricting children’s opportunities to
identify and resolve uncertainty. Children with high IU in the current study spent more
time evaluating available information and were particularly likely to attend to ambiguous
information. Higher IU among children without an anxiety disorder was also associated
with attentional differences in the present study. It is possible that over-processing of
ambiguous and task-irrelevant information among children with higher IU represents
avoidance of uncertainty. Greater emotional reactivity and difficulty with emotional
control associated with IU may increase subjective perceptions of uncertainty regardless
of the true availability of information. Further, uncertainty about uncertainty, or underconfidence about statistical estimates and value judgements, increases the tendency to
rely on short-term information, despite environmental stability. This delays the
accumulation of relevant knowledge and allows for continued attention to irrelevant
information, which increases the subjective perception of uncertainty and prevents
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efficient decision-making (Bishop & Gagne, 2018). Children with higher IU may spend
more time attending to ambiguous information because they require more information to
sufficiently reduce perceived uncertainty. Over time, inefficient processing of and
reactivity to uncertainty may contribute to top-down representations of uncertainty as
aversive, and lead to adult IU patterns of uncertainty avoidance.
Results of the current study may also have implications for models of IU as a risk
factor for anxiety disorder symptoms. While IU may contribute to difficulty processing
ambiguous stimuli generally, exposure to a threatening learning experience (e.g., a
significant life stressor, anxious parenting, etc.) may create a specific difficulty
determining the valence of ambiguous information (i.e.., categorizing ambiguous stimuli
as threatening or neutral). Children who have difficulty accurately categorizing stimuli
fail to learn to inhibit fear responses to ambiguous stimuli over the course of development
(Lau et al., 2011). The inefficient processing of uncertainty associated with IU may also
contribute to inaccurate predictions of the likelihood of future threat and prevent flexible
updating of threat representations based on new information. One study has shown that
increased predictability attenuates startle reactions to threat, while unpredictability
increases startle reactions among children with anxiety disorders, supporting the
hypothesis that an interaction between uncertainty processing and threat processing exists
among those with anxiety disorders (Nelson & Hajcak, 2017). Together, the overgeneralization of fear responses to ambiguity, biased calculations of threat outcomes
under uncertainty, and rigid responding to perceived threat cues may contribute to the
development of an anxiety disorder.
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Limitations of the Current Study
The current study has several limitations which require consideration. First, the
cross-sectional nature of this study prevents drawing causal conclusions about the results.
While the results were considered in the context of developmental models of emotional
and cognitive control and developmental psychopathology, longitudinal investigations of
IU will be required to establish causation between the outcomes examined. Specifically,
it is unclear whether IU contributes to weaknesses in executive functioning or if
executive functioning deficits contribute to IU. Longitudinal studies will be particularly
important in determining how IU and early temperamental risk factors, such as
behavioral inhibition and negative affect, relate. Given the nonsignificant relation
between age and other variables in the current study, a broader age range may also be
useful in determining how IU impacts the development of uncertainty across childhood
and into adulthood.
Second, while the current study focused on two aspects of executive functioning
(i.e., emotional and attentional control) there are other relevant functions involved in
uncertainty processing that warrant consideration in the study of IU. Working memory is
a key aspect of executive function associated with decision-making under uncertainty
(Cui et al., 2015). Deficits in working memory ability have been implicated in the
development of psychopathology broadly (Huang-Pollock, Shapiro, Galloway-Long, &
Weigard, 2017; Vytal, Arkin, Overstreet, Lieberman, & Grillon, 2016) and anxiety
disorders specifically (Bishop, 2009). In the current study, distractors in the ambiguous
condition may have represented higher working memory load, as the scene contained two
different distractors rather than two of the same image. While executive functions are
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separable constructs, deficits in one area are often related to deficits in others (Chevalier,
2015), and it is possible that the attentional and emotional control difficulties identified
among children with high IU in the current study represent difficulties with executive
functioning more broadly, or are related to a different specific executive function
difficulty, such as working memory.
Third, the study task relied on distractors that represented both threat ambiguity
and statistical uncertainty. This may limit the ability to draw conclusions about the
relation between IU and uncertainty or threat processing individually. As anxiety disorder
development likely results from differences in both uncertainty and threat processing, it
will be important for future studies to vary the degree of uncertainty and threat within the
experimental paradigm independently to examine how differences in each pathway
contribute to anxiety disorders. For example, examining differences in physiological
(e.g., pupil dilation, startle-blink, skin conductance) and behavioral (e.g., avoidance,
perseveration, distractibility) responses to a cue that signals an aversive outcome in low
uncertainty, high uncertainty, and volatile conditions, holding the objective aversiveness
of the outcome constant, and comparing this to responses when the cue-outcome statistics
are stable but the aversiveness varies.
Finally, the current study drew conclusions about attention from measures of eyegaze, which are related to overt, behavioral aspects of attention, but not necessarily covert
attention (Gibb et al., 2016). While these measures can provide important information
about what and how children attend to visual scenes, they do not capture the full range of
attentional processes. Most studies examining biased attention in anxiety disorders
employ dot-probe paradigms to examine differences in covert attention to threat (Kruijt,

70

Field, & Fox, 2016). However, these studies are limited in the conclusions that can be
made about attentional differences over time and in naturalistic settings (Gamble &
Rapee, 2009). Examinations of attentional differences in IU may be strengthened by the
use of paradigms that engage overt and covert attention independently, such as gazecontingent masking (Hermans & De Houwer, 2010).
Summary and Future Directions
IU is associated with increased attention toward off-task distractors and increased
RT during decision-making due to greater variability in responding. Children with higher
IU are particularly distracted by ambiguously threatening stimuli and take longer to
suppress attention to distractors in ambiguous conditions than children with lower IU.
The relation between IU and distraction is present among both children with and without
anxiety disorders. The current study is one of the first to examine the relation between
childhood IU and attention and behavior under uncertainty. Children with higher IU are
more likely to engage in over-processing of ambiguous stimuli and experience off-task
attentional lapses during decision-making. In real world situations, children with higher
IU may spend more time considering irrelevant information when attempting to make a
decision and may be particularly likely to engage in this behavior when they are less
certain about a decision, have less experience with the decision they are making, or are
underconfident about their ability to make an adequate decision. They may become easily
distracted by unimportant details and subsequently delay decision-making because their
subjective uncertainty remains high due to time spent processing extraneous information
that does not reduce true levels of uncertainty. These decision-making difficulties may
ultimately contribute to beliefs that uncertainty is unfair and avoidance of decision-
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making through adherence to rigid patterns of behavior and distress when confronted
with unexpected change.
IU has been consistently identified as a risk factor for the development of anxiety
disorders, but research concerning attentional patterns among youth with and at risk for
these disorders has yielded conflicting results. A large body of literature indicates that
anxiety, in clinical and community samples, is associated with attentional bias toward
threat (Puliafico & Kendall, 2006). This finding is based primarily on studies of
attentional orienting, however, and studies examining sustained attention indicate that
anxiety is associated with attentional avoidance of threat (Sonuga-Barke, Cortese,
Fairchild, & Stringaris, 2016). Future studies should seek to examine multiple aspects of
attention, namely sustained attention, attentional orienting, and executive attention, in
both threatening and uncertain environments to inform models of information processing
biases associated with the development of anxiety disorders.
Mixed findings are likely also due to the inclusion of clinically and sub-clinically
anxious children in these studies. Children at risk for developing anxiety disorders do not
show the same information processing biases as children with anxiety disorders in past
studies (Ewing et al., 2016). In the present study, IU was associated with increased
distractibility to neutral distractors only among children without anxiety disorders. It is
possible that information processing among children at risk for developing an anxiety
disorder is not representative of information processing biases among clinically anxious
youth. The current study posits that IU represents individual differences in uncertainty
processing that interact with aberrant threat processing to give rise to anxiety disorders.
Thus, future studies should seek to differentiate attention and behavior associated with IU
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from that associated with chronic anxiety by examining children with anxiety disorders,
children at-risk for anxiety disorders, and typically developing children.
The current study also identified a relation between worry, but not IU or anxiety,
and fixation duration skewness. Increases in fixation duration skewness precede episodes
of mind-wandering, and worry is associated with increased functional connectivity
between brain areas associated with decision-making and those associated with mindwandering. The finding in the current study was exploratory, however, fixation duration
distribution may serve as an indicator of worry. Further, as IU is typically a robust
predictor of worry, the nonsignificant relation between IU and fixation duration
distribution may suggest that this skewness reflects a cognitive vulnerability for worry
independent from maladaptive uncertainty processing. Future studies should seek to
investigate the relation between risk factors for anxiety disorders, including IU and
worry, in relation to multiple characteristics of eye-gaze, including distribution and
frequency.
Finally, future studies should investigate whether IU can be targeted prior to the
development of a psychological disorder as a preventative intervention. The current
results suggest that IU among both anxious and non-anxious children contributes to
attentional and behavioral differences during decision-making. Use of measures such as
the IUSC could help identify children who are at-risk for developing the disorders
associated with IU. Because IU is associated with a broad range of disorders, the IUSC
may be a more efficient predictor of future difficulties, rather than screening for the
presence of each disorder symptom separately. Interventions could target decisionmaking difficulties broadly, including prolonged perseveration on ambiguous
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information, difficulty identifying and using the emotional valence of information in
decision-making, inaccurate probability estimation of outcomes, and emotion
dysregulation specifically related to incorrect choices. Future studies should examine the
utility of measures such as the IUSC for identifying children who later develop
psychological disorders, and the usefulness of treatments that target behaviors related to
IU. In settings where children are more likely to experience threatening events that could
interact with IU to produce disorder symptoms (e.g., chronically ill children in pediatric
settings), the IUSC may serve as a useful tool for identifying vulnerable children.
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